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V 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
ROMEO LUCERO OLIY AREZ, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20150284-CA 
Appellant is not incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code §78A-4-103 (2)(e). See Addendum A 
(Change of Plea, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment); R.85-86. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant 
for failing to signal for two seconds prior to each lane change in a two lane change 
scenario when defendant complied with Utah's lane change law that simply requires a 
driver to initiate a signal prior to the beginning of a vehicle's movement? 
Standard of Review: "[T]he factual findings supporting the trial court's decision 
that the stop and search were conducted in a constitutionally permissible manner are 
reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard, while the ultimate legal determination 
that the stop and search comported with the Fourth Amendment is reviewed for 
correctness." State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved by defense counsel at a Motion to 
Suppress Hearing held on December 9, 2013. R. 35-46, 138-172. This issue was also 
preserved through a Sery plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. See Utah R.Crim.P. 11 (j); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938-39 
(Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
Issue II: Whether the officer lacked justification to impound the vehicle, in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, when the vehicle was not unlawfully parked nor 
causing a traffic hazard, when the defendant was able to contact the owner of the vehicle 
to take quick custody of the vehicle, but was not given the opportunity to do so, and when 
the officer failed to comply with standardized impound procedures? 
Standard of Review: "[T]he factual findings supporting the trial court's decision 
that the stop and search were conducted in a constitutionally permissible manner are 
reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard, while the ultimate legal determination 
that the stop and search comported with the Fourth Amendment is reviewed for 
correctness." State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved by defense counsel at a Motion to 
Suppress Hearing held on December 9, 2013. R. 35-46, 138-172. This issue is also 
preserved through a Sery plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. See Utah R.Crim.P. 11 (j); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938-39 
(Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are relevant to the issues on appeal. Their text is provided 
in full in Addendum B: United States Constitution, Amendments IV and XIV. Utah Code 
§41-6a-804. Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1101(1) (2011). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
An Information charged Romeo Lucero Olivarez ("Mr. Olivarez") with five 
charges that stemmed from a traffic stop that occurred on April 30, 2013. R. 1-3. After a 
bindover of the matter at a Preliminary Hearing, Mr. Olivarez's trial counsel filed a 
Motion & Memorandum to Suppress Evidence which argued, in part, that Officer Jeremy 
Crowther (Officer Crowther) performed an unreasonable stop of Mr. Olivarez under the 
Fourth Amendment. R. 24-25, 35-46. The State filed an Objection to Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress. R. 47-55. After evidence was presented and argued at the Motion Hearing, 
the trial court denied Mr. Olivarez's request to suppress evidence. R. 56-60, 65-68, 138-
172; see also Addendum C (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). Subsequently, on 
April 6, 2015, Mr. Olivarez entered conditional guilty pleas, pursuant to State v. Sery, 
758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), to two counts of Possession or Use of a Controlled 
Substance, both third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code §58-37-8(2)(a)(i). R. 86-
93. Mr. Olivarez was sentenced to a suspended prison term for both felony counts and 
was placed on AP&P supervision for this matter. R. 85-86. Mr. Olivarez filed a timely 
notice of appeal. R. 75-76. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Facts Relevant to the Stop of Mr. Olivarez 
On April 30, 2013, Mr. Olivarez was driving a white vehicle in the vicinity of 79 
West and 900 South, in Salt Lake County. R. 1, 142-144. At one point, Mr. Olivarez 
initiated his turning signal to indicate that he was preparing to change lanes. R. 142, 153. 
After initiating his signal, Mr. Olivarez proceeded to change lanes. R. 142, 153. He then 
travelled across two lanes of traffic "in one continuous movement" until he reached the 
far right lane. R. 142, 153. Because of this driving pattern, Officer Crowther activated his 
lights and initiated a stop of Mr. Olivarez. R. 143-144. 
At the Motion Hearing, Officer Crowther testified that although Mr. Olivarez 
initiated his traffic signal prior to changing lanes, he nevertheless stopped Mr. Olivarez 
because he "went across all the traffic without leaving the appropriate two second 
signal." R. 142. Officer Crowther specifically noted that there were a total of four lanes 
on the road and that Mr. Olivarez began "in Lane 2, signal[ ed], and then [ went] across the 
lane of traffic to the far right or No. 4 lane." R. 142; R. 153. Thus, Officer Crowther 
pulled over Mr. Olivarez because, in making "one continuous movement," he failed to 
signal for two seconds when traveling from lane 3 to lane 4, even though Mr. Olivarez 
properly signaled prior to starting his lane change from lane 2. R. 65-66, 142; R. 153. 
B. Facts Relevant to Officer Crowther's Decision to Impound 
After Officer Crowther initiated his lights, Mr. Olivarez pulled over to "the side of 
the road" and stopped the vehicle "outside the lane of travel." R. 148. Officer Crowther 
then approached Mr. Olivarez and asked him for his license, registration, and proof of 
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insurance. R. 145, 156. Mr. Olivarez did not have his driver's license on him. R. 145-146. 
Officer Crowther then used Mr. Olivarez's name and date of birth to confirm that Mr. 
Olivarez's license was denied. R. 146. In addition, Officer Crowther obtained 
information that the vehicle that Mr. Olivarez was driving was not registered to him. R. 
146, 156. 
Officer Crowther then "did a little bit of research" and looked into whether Mr. 
Olivarez had any warrants or criminal history. R. 146-147, 156. This research revealed 
that Officer Crowther had "previous encounters" with Mr. Olivarez and had arrested him 
"several months prior." R. 147. Officer Crowther also found information that showed that 
Mr. Olivarez was both "a documented gang member" and "documented drug user." R. 
14 7. At this point, Officer Crowther decided that he was going to impound the vehicle. R. 
147. At the Motion Hearing, Officer Crowther testified that he decided to impound the 
vehicle "[d]ue to the fact that [Mr. Olivarez] was driving on a denied or he didn't have a 
valid driver's license." R. 14 7. 
A second police officer arrived to assist Officer Crowther, and after he arrived, 
both officers approached Mr. Olivarez to inform him that because his "driver's license 
was suspended or denied[,]" Officer Crowther "was going to impound the vehicle." R. 
147-148. 
Upon hearing that the vehicle was going to be impounded, Mr. Olivarez asked to 
make a phone call. R. 149. Officer Crowther informed Mr. Olivarez that "he could make 
his phone call once he was outside the vehicle so [Officer Crowther] could start the 
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impound." R. 149. 1 Officer Crowther testified at the Motion Hearing that Mr. Olivarez 
had told him at some point that the car belonged to his brother and that he wished to call 
him, but Officer Crowther could not remember when that information was conveyed to 
him. R. 153-154. 
C. Facts Relevant to the Arrest of Mr. Olivarez 
Once Mr. Olivarez stepped out of the vehicle, Officer Crowther asked him if he 
was in possession of any weapons or anything illegal. R. 149, 156. Mr. Olivarez replied 
that he had a pair of brass knuckles in the front pocket of his shorts. R. 149, 157. Mr. 
Olivarez also consented to a search of his person. R. 149, 157. The search of Mr. 
Olivarez resulted in Officer Crowther finding the brass knuckles. R. 150. 
Officer Crowther handcuffed and arrested Mr. Olivarez because of the concealed 
weapon that he was carrying. R. 150. Mr. Olivarez was then taken to the front seat of 
Officer Crowther's vehicle. R. 150. 
D. Facts Relevant to the Impound Search and Arrival of Mr. Olivarez's Brother 
After placing Mr. Olivarez in the police vehicle, the two officers started an 
impound inventory search. R. 150, 152. The search resulted in finding "a blue flashlight 
on the front seat, driver's side floor that contained meth, methamphetamine, heroin, and 
marijuana and then a glass pipe that appeared to have been used to smoke narcotics was 
also located near the driver's seat." R. 152. 
1 At the Preliminary Hearing, Officer Crowther testified that Mr. Olivarez asked to make 
a phone call in order "to have somebody ... come pick up the vehicle or come pick him 
up." R. 113, 124. Officer Crowther also testified at the Preliminary Hearing that Mr. 
Olivarez did not consent to the search of his vehicle. R. 125. 
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After the impound search was completed, a tow company arrived and began 
hooking up the vehicle that Mr. Olivarez had been driving to the back of the tow truck. R. 
152. At this point, Mr. Olivarez's brother, the registered owner of the vehicle arrived. R. 
152-153. He arrived as a result of Mr. Olivarez's phone call. R. 151. Because the 
impound process had already begun and was almost complete, the officers proceeded 
with impounding the vehicle rather than giving the vehicle to Mr. Olivarez's brother. R. 
152. 
At the Motion Hearing, Officer Crowther testified that the vehicle was impounded 
because there was no driver qualified to take possession of the vehicle. R. 158. He also 
testified that he did not believe that the car was stolen. R. 159. 
E. Facts Relevant to Salt Lake City Police Department's Impound Policies 
At the Motion Hearing, Officer Crowther provided testimony about the impound 
procedures outlined in Salt Lake City Police Department's Impound Policy ("Impound 
Policy"). R.150-151; see also State's Ex. #2 (The Impound Policy), attached as 
Addendum D. The Impound Policy states that, "[t] o avoid needless expense and 
inconvenience to the vehicle owner, officers shall use discretion in determining whether 
or not a vehicle should be impounded." R.151 (emphasis added); see also Addendum D. 
Officer Crowther also testified that a purpose of an impound search is to "document any 
items [or] articles that are inside the vehicle before it gets impounded so that there's a 
record of what was left inside the vehicle." R. 150. Officer Crowther complied with the 
impound policy by filling out an impound form. R. 150-151. 
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A copy of the Impound Policy was submitted as evidence at the Motion Hearing. 
R. 151; see also Addendum D. This Impound Policy states that "[ o ]fficers of this 
Department may impound vehicles as a means of enforcing local and State laws, 
removing a public hazard or nuisance, securing evidence, or protecting the vehicle and its 
contents until the owner can take possession of it." see Addendum D; see also R. 154. 
According to the Impound Policy, police officers are not supposed to impound an 
occupied vehicle if its registration has been expired for less than 90 days. Id. If the 
vehicle registration has been expired for more than 90 days, an officer "may" impound 
the occupied vehicle, but "[ o ]fficers may exercise discretion on the side of not 
impounding as the facts of the situation dictate." Id. (emphasis added). In addition, the 
Impound Policy states that unoccupied vehicles that lack proper registration will not be 
impounded unless there is a need to enforce "any City Ordinances applicable, including 
abandoned vehicles and streets for storage." Id. The Impound Policy also points out that 
vehicles will not be impounded simply because they are not insured. Id. 
F. Facts Relevant to the Motion Hearing 
At the Motion Hearing, defense counsel argued that the stop of Mr. Olivarez was 
not justified because the method by which Mr. Olivarez changed lanes complied with 
applicable Utah law. R. 160. Further, defense counsel argued that the officer made a 
"mistake in law" in thinking that there was a legal requirement for Mr. Olivarez to "stop 
for any particular time in lane 3 before going over to lane 4." R. 160. Defense counsel 
also argued that the vehicle impound violated the Impound Policy that the officer was 
required to follow. See R. 162. (The vehicle "was [in] a safe place, not blocking traffic ... 
8 
its part of their policy ... to protect a vehicle and its contents until the owner can take 
possession of it."). Furthermore, "Mr. Olivarez had called his brother and told [Officer 
Crowther] he wanted his brother to come take possession of the car and the officer 
refused to do that." R. 163. 
At the Motion Hearing, the State argued that Mr. Olivarez's lane change was 
illegal because it was not made with "reasonable safety" as is required by the statute 
regarding lane changes. R. 164. The State also argued that the statute requires a driver to 
signal for two seconds prior to commencing a lane change, but also to "remain[] in [each] 
lane for two additional seconds" when completing a lane change involving several lanes. 
R. 164. 
The State argued that the vehicle impound was permissible because the impound 
policy gives discretion to officers in determining whether to impound a vehicle. R. 164. 
The State also argued that the officer used his discretion to impound the vehicle because 
the vehicle had only one occupant who did not have a valid driver's license. R. 164. The 
State argued that "the impound inventory was appropriate at the time of the stop." R. 164. 
The State pointed out that by the time the owner of the vehicle arrived, the impound 
process was almost complete and the Fourth Amendment did not require Officer 
Crowther to ignore the results of the inventory search that was already completed. R. 165. 
The trial judge concluded that the stop of Mr. Olivarez was justified. R. 67, 166; 
Addendum C. The trial court also concluded that Officer Crowther acted within his 
discretion to impound the vehicle because "the totality of circumstances" showed that 
Mr. Olivarez was "operating a vehicle without a license, was not the proper owner of that 
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vehicle ... [and that he] made admissions to a dangerous weapon." R. 67, 166; Addendum 
C. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Officer Crowther lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 
wrongdoing to justify the traffic stop of Mr. Olivarez. Utah's lane change law requires a 
driver to signal for two seconds prior to beginning or initiating their vehicle's movement. 
Mr. Olivarez complied with this law. Officer Crowther, however, unreasonably mistook 
Utah's lane change law to require that a driver be required to signal and stay in each lane 
for two seconds when doing a lane change involving several lanes. Utah's lane change 
law is clear, unambiguous, and contrary to Officer Crowther's interpretation of the law. 
Because Officer Crowther's interpretation was not a reasonable mistake of law, the traffic 
stop of Mr. Olivarez was unjustified and the fruits obtained from the unconstitutional stop 
should have been suppressed by the trial court. 
The impound search of the vehicle was unreasonable and improper for numerous 
reasons. The impound search was tainted by the illegal stop of Mr. Olivarez. In addition, 
the impoundment of the vehicle was not authorized by state statute. The totality of the 
circumstances also showed that Officer Crowther lacked a legitimate community care-
taking purpose to impound the vehicle that Mr. Olivarez was driving. The vehicle was 
stopped at the side of the road and was not impeding traffic, thus police custodial care of 
the vehicle was not necessary. In addition, the registered owner of the vehicle, Mr. 
Olivarez's brother, was able to quickly retrieve the vehicle from the scene. However, 
rather than allowing for the release of the vehicle to its registered owner, Officer 
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Crowther improperly impounded and searched the vehicle. The impoundment of the 
vehicle also violated the standardized impoundment procedures that Officer Crowther 
was required to follow. Because the initial stop and ensuing vehicle impound was 
improper under the Fourth Amendment, the illegally obtained fruits of the impound 
search should have been suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Officer Crowther Lacked Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion of Wrongdoing 
to Justify the Stop of Mr. Olivarez 
The United States Constitution provides a protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. U. S. Const. Amends IV, XIV. The stop of an automobile by a 
police officer constitutes a seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
must therefore be reasonable to withstand a constitutional challenge. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979). A stop is 
considered reasonable, or justified, if "a police officer has a reasonable suspicion, prior to 
the stop, that a person is engaging in, or has engaged in, criminal behavior." Salt Lake 
City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, if 7, 177 P.3d 655, 659. 
Here, Officer Crowther lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Olivarez because: 
1) Mr. Olivarez's lane change complied with Utah law regarding lane change 
requirements, and 2) Officer Crowther did not make a reasonable mistake of law in 
deciding to stop Mr. Olivarez for his lane change maneuver. 
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C. Mr. Olivarez's Lane Change Was Legal Under Utah Law 
The lane changes completed by Mr. Olivarez complied with Utah law. Utah Code 
§41-6a-804 outlines the requirements of lane changes. It says, 
(a) person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left on a roadway or change lanes 
until: 
(i) the movement can be made with reasonable safety; and 
(ii) an appropriate signal has been given as provided under this section. 
(b) A signal of intention to tum right or left or to change lanes shall be given 
continuously for at least the last two seconds preceding the beginning of the 
movement. 
Utah Code §4 l-6a-804 ( emphasis added). 2 
Under §41-6a-804 (b), a driver must signal prior to starting a lane change 
maneuver. The plain language of subsection (b) specifically and clearly requires that the 
signal be initiated for the two seconds "preceding," or before, the vehicle begins moving. 
See Lorenzo v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2002 UT App 371, iJ 11, 58 P.3d 873 ("'The plain 
language controls the interpretation of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity do we look 
beyond the plain language"' )(quoting Vigos v. Mountain/and, 2000 UT 2, iJ 13, 993 P.2d 
207). See also Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497,500 (Utah 1989) ("Unambiguous 
language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning."). 
Here, Mr. Olivarez's lane change maneuver complied with Utah's lane change 
law. Prior to changing lanes, Mr. Olivarez initiated his signal ''preceding the beginning 
of the movement" of his vehicle. Utah Code §41-6a-804. R. 142, 153. It was only after 
2 Prior to 2007, Utah Code §41-6a-804(b) required a driver to signal "for at least the last 
three seconds preceding the beginning of the movement." ( emphasis added). Thus, the 
current version of the statute reduced the signaling requirement for lane changes from 
being three seconds to two seconds. 
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v) 
initiating his signal that Mr. Olivarez proceeded to change lanes. R. 142, 153. He then 
travelled across two lanes of traffic "in one continuous movement" until he reached the 
far right lane. R. 142, 153. As a result of this driving pattern, Officer Crowther activated 
his lights and initiated a stop of Mr. Olivarez. R. 143-144. However, because Mr. 
Olivarez complied with the clear language of Utah Code §41-6a-804 by signaling before 
beginning his "one continuous movement," his lane change maneuver was legal and 
Officer Crowther's stop of him was not justified. R. 142, 153. See Bench, 2008 UT App 
30, ifif 7, 12-13 (a traffic stop of the defendant was not justified because even though 
defendant was changing lanes too slowly, he complied with the statutory requirement by 
signaling prior to beginning his lane change.). 
Because Officer Crowther lacked justification to stop Mr. Olivarez, the fruits of 
the stop are tainted and should have been suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471 (1963). See also State v. Callahan, 2004 UT App 164, if 8, 93 P.3d 103 ('"The 
exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative (the 
'fruit of unlawful police conduct'), obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional 
and statutory rights."') ( citations omitted). Thus, the trial court erred in not suppressing 
the evidence as a result of the improper and unconstitutional stop of Mr. Olivarez. 
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D. Officer Crowther's Interpretation of Utah's Lane Change Law Was 
Not a Reasonable Mistake of Law 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a traffic stop can be justified if a 
police officer makes a reasonable mistake of law. Heien v. N. Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 
532 (2014). In Heien, a police officer stopped a vehicle because one of its two break 
lights was not working. The officer, however, made a mistake in interpreting an 
ambiguous North Carolina statute which only required that a driver have a single working 
brake light. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534. The United States Supreme Court held that despite 
the mistake of law, reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop existed because the police 
officer's mistake about the North Carolina brake light law was reasonable. Id. at 534, 
539-40. In determining whether an officer's mistake is reasonable, a court should "not 
examine the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved." Heien, 135 S. 
Ct. at 539. See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) ("Subjective intentions 
play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis."). Rather, "the 
Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes-whether of 
fact or law-must be objectively reasonable." Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (alterations in the 
original). 
A police officer makes an objectively reasonable mistake of law only when the 
law at issue is ambiguous. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534, 540-41. In Heien, the Court held that 
the officer's mistake of law was objectively reasonable because the "unclear" and 
"ambiguous" North Carolina statute regarding stop lamps contained words that could 
lead one to reasonably, but mistakenly, believe that more than one brake light was 
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required. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534 540-41. The Heien court noted that "[a]lthough the 
North Carolina statute at issue refers to 'a stop lamp,' suggesting the need for only a 
single working brake light, it also provides that '[t]he stop lamp may be incorporated into 
a unit with one or more other rear lamps." Id. at 540. In addition, "another subsection of 
the same provision requires that vehicles 'have all originally equipped rear lamps or the 
equivalent in good working order.' ... arguably indicating that if a vehicle has multiple 
'stop lamp[s],' all must be functional." Id. at 540 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court held 
that because the North Carolina statute failed to articulate the difference between a stop 
lamp and a brake light, and also made reference to multiple stop "lamps" in the plural, 
rather than just a singular "lamp," it was objectively reasonable for the police officer to 
mistakenly interpret the law as requiring a driver to have more than one operating brake 
light. Id. 
Circumstances where a police officer makes a reasonable mistake of law will be 
"exceedingly rare" because it will only apply in those instances where "the statute is 
genuinely ambiguous[,]" and where "the statute must pose a 'really difficult' or 'very 
hard question of statutory interpretation."' Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J. and 
Ginsberg, J ., concurring). See also Michael A. Haiwin, Ignorance of the Law is No 
Excuse-Unless You Are a Police Officer: Limiting Heien v. North Carolina in 
Pretextual DUI Stops, 2015 WL 5565330, at *2 (2015). In concluding that the police 
officer in Heien made a reasonable mistake of the North Carolina statute, the Court 
pointed out that the North Carolina statute regarding rear lamps posed a "quite difficult 
question of interpretation." Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 542 (Kagan, J. and Ginsberg, J., 
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concurring). Thus, Heien should not be interpreted as allowing police officers a 
reasonable mistake of law when the law that is being interpreted is clearly and 
unambiguously stated. Id. "Heien is not an invitation for officers to play fast and loose 
with the law: 'an officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy 
study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce."' Ha,win, supra, at *3(quoting Heien, 135 
S. Ct. at 539-40). 
An example of an unreasonable mistake of law by a police officer involved New 
Jersey's high beam statute. State v. Scriven, No. A-5680-13T3, 2015 WL 773824 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 12, 2015). The plain language of the New Jersey statute 
prohibited a driver from using his high beams when within five hundred feet of an 
operating and oncoming vehicle who is in the opposing lane of traffic. Id. In Scriven, a 
police officer stopped a driver for failing to tum off his vehicle's head beams when 
driving past the officer who was located in the same lane and was standing outside of his 
vehicle. Id. The police officer stopped the vehicle because he interpreted the New Jersey 
high beam statute as qualifying his police car as an "oncoming vehicle." Id. Applying 
Heien, the court held that the officer made an unreasonable mistake in interpreting the 
"clear and unambiguous" New Jersey statute because the officer's "patrol car was 
stationary and unoperated and it was not in the lane of traffic ... opposite the driver." Id. 
See also Attocknie v. Smith, 798 F.3d 1252, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2015) (a deputy sheriff 
was not granted immunity for barging into a home and shooting an inhabitant because he 
had a gross misunderstanding of the clearly established hot pursuit of a felon doctrine). 
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Another example of a police officer committing an unreasonable mistake of law 
involved Texas's tum statute. United States v. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 246,250 (5th 
Cir. 2015). The Texas statute required a driver to signal 100 feet prior to making a tum. 
In Alvardo-Zara, a police officer interpreted the Texas statue to justify his stop of a driver 
for failing to signal 100 feet prior to changing lanes. Id. at 249-50. Applying Heien, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the officer's mistake oflaw was not objectively 
reasonable because the plain language of the Texas statute clearly and unambiguously 
only applied to turns and not lane changes. Id. The court noted that the officer "did not 
interpret the statute that narrowly[,]" and that the Texas statute referred "to turns and lane 
changes separately, thereby setting out a distinction between the two." Id. The court also 
noted that Texas case law and the Texas Driver's Handbook also proved that the police 
officer's interpretation of the Texas tum law statute was unreasonably mistaken. Id. 
Here, Officer Crowther mistakenly and unreasonably interpreted Utah Code §41-
6a-804, which provides unambiguous and clearly established law regarding lane change 
requirements. See Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d at 250. At the Motion Hearing, Officer 
Crowther testified that although Mr. Olivarez initiated his traffic signal prior to changing 
lanes, he nevertheless stopped Mr. Olivarez because he "went across all the traffic 
without leaving the appropriate two second signal." R. 142. Officer Crowther specifically 
noted that there were a total of four lanes on the road and that Mr. Olivarez began "in 
Lane 2, signal[ed], and then [went] across the lane of traffic to the far right or No. 4 
lane." R. 142; R. 153. Officer Crowther pulled over Mr. Olivarez because he failed to 
signal for two seconds when traveling from lane 3 to lane 4, even though Mr. Olivarez 
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properly signaled prior to starting his lane change from lane 2. R. 142; R. 153. Thus, 
Officer Crowther interpreted Utah's lane change law as requiring a driver to signal and 
remain for two seconds in each lane change in a two lane change scenario. 
The plain language of Utah Code §41-6a-804(b) shows that Officer Crowther 
made an unreasonable and mistaken interpretation of Utah's lane change law. As stated 
supra, the plain language of Utah's lane change law requires a driver to signal "for at 
least the last two seconds preceding the beginning of the [vehicle's] movement.,, Utah 
Code §41-6a-804(b) ( emphasis added). The plain language of Utah Code §41-6a-804(b) 
is clear and unambiguous. Cf Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534 540-41. It states that the two 
second requirement only applies prior to the initial movement of the vehicle in a lane 
change maneuver. 
In addition, interpreting the plain language of Utah's lane change law to require a 
driver to stay in each lane for two seconds when doing a multiple lane change is 
unreasonable and mistaken as this interpretation contradicts the requirement in subsection 
(a) that a lane change must only occur when it can be made with "reasonable safety." 
Utah Code §41-6a-804(a).That is, completing a reasonably safe lane change could require 
seconds or minutes to complete, depending upon traffic, lighting conditions, and a myriad 
of other road hazards that might exist when making a lane change. Thus, a plain language 
reading of Utah's lane changing statute reveals that the statute does not dictate the 
number of seconds that a car is required to stay in each lane in order to do a multiple lane 
change with reasonable safety. See Utah Code §41-6a-804(a). Rather, the plain language 
of the statute makes explicit the number of seconds (two) that a driver must signal before 
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"beginning" their lane change maneuver, consisting of one or more lanes, so that the 
driver effectively notifies other drivers that the movement of their car is about to begin. 
See Utah Code §41-6a-804(b). Thus, because the plain language of Utah Code §41-6a-
804 is unambiguous and clearly stated, Officer Crowther made an unreasonable mistake 
oflaw in his interpretation of Utah's lane change law. See Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d at 
250; see also Scriven, 2015 WL 773824. 
Applying Alvardo-Zarza, Utah case law pertaining to Utah's lane change laws 
interprets the signaling requirement of the statute to apply prior to the beginning of the 
lane change movement, as opposed to after a lane change maneuver has already begun. 
Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 249-50; see also United States v. Paul, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 
1163 (D. Utah 2003) (Applying Utah's pre-2007 statute, a traffic stop of a vehicle was 
justified where an officer "observed a violation of Utah law when he saw defendant's 
vehicle change lanes before signaling/or the required three seconds ... [and the officer] 
testified that the defendant did not signal a lane change until she had already crossed into 
the center lane). See also Bench, 2008 UT App 30, ,r12 (A stop was not justified where 
the driver "signal[ ed] two seconds longer than legally required before changing lanes .. 
[as] drivers must signal at least three seconds before changing lanes.") ( emphasis added). 
United States v. Slater, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1214, at 1216 (D. Utah 2005). ("Utah law 
requires that a vehicle signal for three seconds before making a lane change.") ( emphasis 
added). 
Similar to Alvardo-Zarza, the Utah Drivers Handbook ("Handbook") further 
demonstrates that Officer Crowther unreasonably interpreted Utah's lane change statute 
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because the Handbook indicates that there is a "distinction" between the rules regarding 
signaling requirements and those rules regarding lane changes, and that these rules are 
treated separately from each other. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 249-50; see also 2015 
Handbook, Chapter 3, attached at Addendum E. That is, a comparison of the "Signaling" 
section of the Handbook with the "Changing lanes" section of the Handbook shows that 
these sections give "distinct" and "separate" rules to follow to ensure driver safety. See 
Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 249-50. For instance, in Chapter 3, the "Signaling" section 
states that drivers should signal "for two seconds before beginning any lane change." See 
Addendum E. (emphasis added). This requirement tracks the language of Utah Code 
§4 l-6a-804 that requires a driver to initiate a signal ''preceding the beginning of the 
movement" of their vehicle. However, as with Utah Code §41-6a-804, the "Signaling" 
section in the Handbook does not mention any signaling requirement that should be 
followed after the lane change has begun. In addition, the "Changing Lanes" section of 
the Handbook, in Chapter 3, provides a number of requirements that will ensure that a 
driver makes a safe lane change, such as the need to "glance in your rearview mirror," 
"check[] over your shoulder, "and "maintain your speed." See Addendum E. This section, 
however does not mention any requirement that a signal must be initiated for two seconds 
after a lane change has begun, or that a vehicle must remain in each lane change for two 
seconds when doing a lane change involving several lanes. 3 
3The 2013 edition of the Utah Driver Handbook is not available. However, The Utah 
Government Digital Library contains the following editions of the Utah Driver 
Handbook: 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. See Archived editions of the Utah 
Driver Handbook, UTAH GOVERNMENT DIGITAL LIBRARY, http://digitallibrary.utah.gov 
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Thus, the plain language of Utah Code §41-6a-804(b ), Utah case law regarding 
lane changes, and the Utah Drivers Handbook individually and collectively show that 
Officer Crowther made an unreasonable mistake of law in believing that he had 
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Mr. Olivarez for failing to signal and remain for 
two seconds in each lane in a two lane change scenario. R. 65-66, 142; R. 153. Rather, 
Mr. Olivarez complied with Utah's lane change law because he initiated a signal prior to 
starting his lane changes that consisted of "one continuous movement." R. 65-66, 142; R. 
153. Because Officer Crowther lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Mr. 
Olivarez, the fruits of the unconstitutional stop are tainted and the trial court should have 
suppressed them. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See also State v. 
Callahan, 2004 UT App 164, iJ 8, 93 P.3d 103. 
This issue was preserved by defense counsel at a Motion to Suppress Hearing held 
on December 9, 2013. R. 160-162. Counsel argued that the stop of Mr. Olivarez was not 
justified because Mr. Olivarez complied with "the [Utah] code provision relating to 
signaling before changing lanes," and that Officer Crowther's interpretation of the code 
provision was a "mistake of law." R. 160. Nevertheless, if this Court finds that this issue 
was not preserved, this Court may review it for plain error. Plain error requires reversal 
/awweb/main.jsp. In addition, The Utah Driver License Division website contains the 
2014 and 2015 editions of the Utah Driver Handbook. See Dept. of Public Safety, Driver 
License Div., Utah Driver Handbook (2014), http://dld.utah.gov/wp-content/ uploads 
/sites/17/2015/01/Driver-Handbook-2014.pdf. See also Dept. of Public Safety, Driver 
License Div., Utah Driver Handbook (2015), http://dld.utah.gov/wp-content/ uploads/ 
sites/17/2015/01/ Driver-Handbook-2015.pdf. A comparison of the editions from 2007 to 
2015 shows no changes to the sections in Chapter 3 of"SIGNALING," and "Changing 
Lanes." 
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where "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and 
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome ... " State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Under a plain error analysis, errors existed here as Mr. Olivarez's lane change 
complied with Utah law; furthermore, Officer Crowther lacked reasonable articulable 
suspicion to stop the vehicle that Mr. Olivarez was driving because he did not make a 
reasonable mistake oflaw in interpreting Utah's unambiguous and clearly stated lane 
change law. See supra 12-19. In addition, the errors should have been obvious to the 
district court under the existing case law as set forth supra at 12-19. The "obviousness 
requirement poses no rigid and insurmountable barrier to review." See State v. Eldredge, 
773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah), cert denied, Eldredge v. Utah, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). That is, 
Utah's lane change law is well established law, as is the case law regarding what 
constitutes reasonable mistakes oflaw. See Utah Code §41-6a-804; see also Heien, 135 
S. Ct. at 534 540-541. Mr. Olivarez was also prejudiced by the errors because he now 
has felony convictions as a result of the unjustified stop the vehicle that he was driving. 
Because obvious error occurred here and that error prejudiced Mr. Olivarez, this court 
can reverse under the plain error doctrine. 
II. The Impound Search of Mr. Olivarez's Vehicle Violated the Fourth 
Amendment Because it Lacked Reasonable and Proper Justification 
Warrantless searches of impounded vehicles must not run afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment. See United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2015) ("The 
government bears the burden of proving that its impoundment of a vehicle satisfies the 
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Fourth Amendment."). The United States Supreme Court has established "that some 
warrantless impoundments are constitutional: namely, those required by the community-
caretaking functions of protecting public safety and promoting the efficient movement of 
traffic." Id. at 1245; see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976) 
(stating "this Court has consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles 
impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing 
or protecting the car and its contents."). Thus, "warrantless searches of impounded 
vehicles for the benign purpose of protecting the police and public from danger, avoiding 
police liability for lost or stolen property, and protecting the owner's property, are 
permitted by the Fourth Amendment." State v. Romero, 624 P. 2d 699, 701 (Utah 1981). 
This Court has held that an impoundment of a vehicle is constitutional only when 
"a reasonable and proper justification existed for the impoundment." State v. Strickling, 
844 P.2d 979, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Furthermore, an officer's subjective motivation 
is not relevant when determining whether an impound is justified; rather, the inquiry 
turns on whether a reasonable officer would have made the impound. Id. at 844 P.2d at 
987. 
Here, the impound search of the vehicle Mr. Olivarez was driving was improper 
for multiple reasons: 1) the impound search was not authorized by state statute; 2) the 
totality of circumstances surrounding the impound show that there was no legitimate 
community care-taking purpose for the impoundment; 3) the impoundment did not follow 
standardized police procedures; and 4) the impound search was tainted by the initial 
unreasonable and unjustified stop of Mr. Olivarez. 
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A. The Impound of the Vehicle Was Not Justified by Utah Statute 
An inventory search pursuant to a vehicle impound is justified, "either through 
explicit statutory authorization or by the circumstances surrounding the initial stop." State 
v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1985). Utah Code §41-la-1101 defines situations 
where statutory authorization for vehicle impounds in Utah is allowed. See Addendum A, 
Utah Code §41-la-1101(1)(201 l)(amended 2015). Utah's impound statute specifically 
allows for vehicles to be impounded in situations where the vehicle has been stolen, 
abandoned, or lacks proper registration, insurance, or identification information. Utah 
Code Ann. §41-la-l l0l(l)(a). See State v. Strickling, 844 P. 2d 979 (1993) (Utah's 
impound statute authorized the impound of a vehicle where proper registration was 
lacking). 
An examination of Utah's impound statute shows that the impound of the vehicle 
driven by Mr. Olivarez was not authorized by statute. Officer Crowther stated that his 
decision to impound the vehicle was based upon "the fact that [Mr. Olivarez] was driving 
on a denied or he didn't have a valid driver's license." R. 147. A review of Utah's 
impound statute does not, however, provide explicit authority for a police officer to 
impound a vehicle in a scenario where the driver is driving without a valid license. Thus, 
Utah Code §41-1a-1101 (1) (2011) did not provide authority for Officer Crowther to 
impound the vehicle that was driven by Mr. Olivarez. 
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B. The Totality of Circumstances Show That There Was No Legitimate 
Community Care-Taking Purpose For The Impoundment 
Police officers are given authority to impound vehicles in situations not expressly 
authorized by statute when the circumstances show that a police officer is both following 
standardized police procedures and acting in a community-caretaking role. See Sanders, 
796 F.3d at 1243 ("when a vehicle is not impeding traffic or impairing public safety, 
impoundments are constitutional only if guided by both standardized criteria and a 
legitimate community-caretaking rationale ... [ and] either failure alone would be 
sufficient to establish unconstitutionality.) ( emphasis added). 
In Opperman, the United States Supreme Court outlined a number of reasons why 
police officers may impound a vehicle for community care-taking purposes: 
To permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some circumstances to preserve 
evidence, disabled or damaged vehicles will often be removed from the highways 
or streets at the behest of police engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control 
activities. Police will also frequently remove and impound automobiles which 
violate parking ordinances and which thereby jeopardize both the public safety 
and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-69. 
By contrast, arbitrary impoundments lack an objectively reasonable community 
care taking purpose. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). To guard against 
arbitrary impoundments, courts have held that impoundments must be "supported by a 
reasonable, non-pretextual justification." Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1249. The purpose of an 
impound cannot be to allow a police officer an opportunity to search for evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing. See United States v. Taylor, 592 F. 3d 1104, 1108 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that an officer cannot impound a vehicle "in bad faith or for the sole purpose of 
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investigation."); see also State v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695 (Utah 1986) ("an inventory search is 
improper when conducted only as a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive 
e.g., to obtain evidence in place of a full-blown investigative search.") (internal citations 
omitted). See also State v. Hygh, 711 P. 2d 264 (Utah 1997) (impound inventory searches 
are illegal if they are "merely a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.") 
(internal quotations omitted). 
Courts employ an objective standard to determine whether an impoundment is 
justified according to a legitimate community care taking purpose. United States v. 
Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 2015). See also Chad Carr, To Impound or Not 
to Impound: Why Courts Need to Define Legitimate lmpoundment Purposes to Restore 
Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights to Motorists, 33 Hamline L. Rev. 95, 110-14 (2010). 
"[T]he existence or absence of justification for the impoundment of an automobile may 
be determined from the surrounding circumstances." State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452,454 
(Utah 1987) see also State v. Gray, 851 P. 2d 1217 (1993); State v. Romero, 624 P. 2d 
699, 701 (Utah 1981). 
Furthermore, when determining whether the totality of circumstances show that an 
impound is based on an objectively reasonable community-caretaking purpose, courts 
have looked at a number of factors, including: 
( 1) whether the vehicle is on public or private property; 
(2) if on private property, whether the property owner has been consulted; 
(3) whether an alternative to impoundment exists (especially another person 
capable of driving the vehicle); 
(4) whether the vehicle is implicated in a crime; and 
(5) whether the vehicle's owner and/or driver have consented to the impoundment. 
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Sanders, 796 F.3d at1250. 
There are limitations placed on police officers when deciding to impound a 
vehicle. The community care-taking purpose does not permit an officer to automatically 
impound and search a vehicle upon the arrest of the vehicle's driver. See Sanders, 796 
F.3d at 1245 ("Opperman 'cannot be used to justify the automatic inventory of every car 
upon the arrest of its owner."') (quoting United States v. Pappas, 735 F. 2d 1232, 1234 
(10th Cir. 1984). Similarly, the community care-taking purpose does not allow an officer 
to automatically impound a vehicle when a driver is given a traffic citation. See Sanders, 
796 F.3d at 1250 (stating that "even if the police were to adopt a standardized policy of 
impounding all vehicles whose owners receive traffic citations, such impoundments 
could be invalidated as unreasonable under our precedent."). 
The Minnesota Supreme Court established a two-prong objective test for 
determining whether an impoundment is justified. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 
(Minn. 2008). See also Chad Carr, supra, at 117. According to the first prong, a 
balancing test is employed to see whether the government had "an interest in 
impoundment that outweigh[ed] the individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures." Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502. And, according to the 
second prong, the government must show that the impoundment complied with 
standardized police procedures. Id. Gauster also pointed out that when determining 
whether an impoundment is necessary or reasonable, it is important to look at the 
circumstances that existed "at the time of the impoundment" Id. at 505. The court 
emphasized that if the totality of circumstances show that the impoundment was not 
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necessary, then "the concomitant [inventory] search is unreasonable." Gauster, Id. at 502. 
(internal quotations omitted). 
In applying the two-prong test, Gauster determined that the impoundment of the 
vehicle in that matter was not justified. Id. at 507. In Gauster, an officer decided to 
impound a vehicle because the driver did not have a valid driver's license nor proof of 
insurance. Id. at 500. When the officer made the decision to impound the vehicle, the 
defendant was not under arrest and was the sole occupant of the vehicle. Id. Once 
informed about the officer's decision to impound, the driver asked if he could arrange for 
someone else to retrieve the vehicle, but the officer refused. Id. The impound search 
resulted in finding methamphetamine, open containers containing alcohol, and a pipe 
used to inject drugs. Id. 
Gauster held that there was no justification for the officer to impound the vehicle 
because there were no safety concerns ( the vehicle was located on the side of a county 
road), and there was no legitimate care-taking need to justify the impound. Id. at 504-508. 
It pointed out that "[b ]ecause [the defendant] took responsibility for the vehicle ... the 
need to protect [the] vehicle was obviated, leaving no proper purpose for the 
impoundment." Id. at 506. The court also highlighted that "[h]ere, there were no 
passengers and no other parties on the scene who could take responsibility for [the 
defendant's] vehicle. But because [the defendant] was not under arrest, [defendant] 
himself ... [he] was available to take custody of the vehicle and make proper 
arrangements." Id. at 506. 
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Gauster also addressed the responsibilities that are placed a police officer when 
deciding to impound a vehicle. Id. at 507-508. The court noted that the Fourth 
Amendment did not require the police to ask an arrested driver if he wants to make 
alternative arrangements for his vehicle prior to impound. Id. at 507. However, in 
situations where the driver is not arrested at the time the officer decides to impound the 
vehicle, the impound is unnecessary and therefore not justified. Id. at 507. Furthermore, 
"police still may be under an obligation to permit a driver to make reasonable alternative 
arrangements when the driver is able to do so and specifically makes a request to do so." 
Id. at 508. Because the defendant in Gauster "was not placed under arrest and ... asked 
[the officer] if he could make his own vehicle arrangements-the impoundment of [the 
defendant's] vehicle was not justified under the Fourth Amendment." Id .. 
Here, applying the Sanders factors, as well Gauster, the impound of the vehicle 
violated the Fourth Amendment because the totality of circumstances show that Officer 
Crowther lacked a legitimate care-taking need to justify the impound the vehicle driven 
by Mr. Olivarez. See Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1250. See also Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502-
507. 
First, even though the vehicle Mr. Olivarez was driving was on public, not private, 
property, it was not unlawfully parked nor causing a traffic hazard. See United States v. 
Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1409-10 (10th Cir. 1992) ("if the position of the vehicle would 
have been a true threat to public safety, the officers would have moved the vehicle to the 
side of the road while waiting for the tow truck to arrive."). Here, Mr. Olivarez had pulled 
over to "the side of the road" and stopped the vehicle "outside the lane of travel." R. 148. 
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Thus, moving the vehicle for traffic purposes was not necessary. Ibarra, 955 F.2d at 
1409-10. 
Second, Officer Crowther failed to allow for an alternative to impound when Mr. 
Olivarez made it clear that a viable and immediate one was available. Gauster, 752 
N.W.2d at 508; see also Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1251 (an impoundment was 
unconstitutional where officers did not allow the defendant "to make alternative 
arrangements, even though she stated that she was willing to have someone up the 
vehicle on her behalf' and the vehicle was lawfully parked in a private lot.); see also 
Pappas, 735 F. 2d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 1984) (the impound search was not justified 
because there were people who could have taken possession of the car once the defendant 
was arrested); see also Rice, 717 P.2d at 696 (an impound was improper where "[t]here 
[was] no evidence that [] the vehicle posed any danger to the officers or the public [ and] 
[ d]efendant was not permitted to have someone pick up his locked truck from the parking 
lot or to arrange other disposition [of his own car]."); see also State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 
264, 268 (Utah 1985) (impound unreasonable where "defendant was given no 
opportunity to arrange for disposition of his own car. The officer neither asked defendant 
whether there was someone who could come and get the car nor asked the passenger 
whether she could take possession of the contents of the car or get someone to come and 
get the car."). 
At the Motion Hearing, Officer Crowther testified that the vehicle was impounded 
because Mr. Olivarez did not have a valid driver's license and there was no driver 
qualified to take possession of the vehicle. R. 147, 158. However, once Officer Crowther 
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told Mr. Olivarez that the vehicle was going to be impounded, Mr. Olivarez asked to call 
his brother, the registered owner of the vehicle, in order for him to take possession of the 
vehicle. R. 149. Mr. Olivarez was not arrested at this time. R. 147-150. In addition, the 
ability of Mr. Olivarez's brother to respond quickly was apparent, as before the vehicle 
was towed away from the scene, Mr. Olivarez's brother arrived to retrieve the vehicle. R. 
149-153, 163. Thus, the impound of the vehicle was neither reasonable nor necessary 
because Mr. Olivarez made it clear that a viable alternative arrangement was available. 
This matter is similar to Gauster. In both matters, at the time that the officer made 
the decision to impound, the driver was not arrested. R. 147-150; see also Gauster, 752 
N.W.2d at 507. Furthermore, both drivers made it clear that they wished to make 
alternative arrangements for the vehicle rather than having the impoundment proceed. R. 
149-153, 163; see also Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 500. Gauster is a well-reasoned, non-
controlling decision that explains why the impoundment violated the Fourth Amendment. 
This Court should also find that the impoundment in this matter was improper. 
Third, the vehicle driven by Mr. Olivarez was not implicated in a crime. Sanders, 
796 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 2015). Officer Crowther specifically testified that he did 
not believe that the car was stolen. R. 159. Cf United States v. Maher, 919 F. 2d 1482, 
1487 (10th Cir. 1990) (an impound was found reasonable "where the vehicle itself was 
evidence of a crime."); see also United States v. Haro-Salcedo, l 07 F.3d 769, 771 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (impound justified because officer had reason to believe that the car was 
stolen). In addition, the vehicle had no connection to the crime for which Officer 
Crowther arrested Mr. Olivarez. That is, Mr. Olivarez was arrested for possessing a 
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concealed weapon because of the pair of brass knuckles that he had in the front pocket of 
his shorts. R. 149-150, 157. See Virgil v. Superior Court, Placer Cty., 268 Cal. App. 2d 
127, 132, 73 Cal. Rptr. 793, (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) ("the arrest of the defendant (for 
vagrancy) had no connection with a necessity to take the accused's car into custody so 
there was no necessity [for impound] here.")). 
Fourth, the vehicle's owner and Mr. Olivarez did not consent to the impound. 
Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1250. Officer Crowther testified that Mr. Olivarez consented to a 
search of his person once he was outside of the vehicle. R. 149, 157. However, there was 
no testimony provided that either Mr. Olivarez or the vehicle's owner consented to a 
search of the vehicle. 
Thus, the "totality of circumstances" surrounding Officer Crowther's decision to 
impound the vehicle shows that the impound was unnecessary and unreasonable. State v. 
Rice, 717 P.2d 695, 696 (1986) ("Absent a statutory basis justifying impoundment, we 
look to the totality of the surrounding circumstances to determine the reasonableness of 
the seizure of the vehicle."). The circumstances instead show that impoundment of the 
vehicle was improperly done for criminal investigation purposes and was not a 
performance of Officer Crowther's community care-taking functions. Sanders, 796 F.3d 
at 1243. 
C. The Impound Search Violated the Salt Lake Police Department's 
Impound Policy 
Impoundments must follow standardized police procedures to be reasonable and 
proper. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375-376 (1987). Standardized procedures 
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delineate the amount of discretion that an officer has when deciding whether to impound 
a vehicle. See Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1245 (stating that police impound procedures 
"circumscribe the discretion of individual officers.") (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). If an officer's decision to impound a vehicle and the subsequent impound 
search do not comply with recognized police standards, then the fruits of the impound 
search should be suppressed. See State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,270 (Utah 1985) (the 
impound inventory search of the defendant's vehicle was improper where the police 
officer failed to comply with standard police procedures that required the officer to fill 
out a standard inventory form). 
Here, Officer Crowther was required to follow the Salt Lake City Police 
Department's Impound Policy. R.150-151; see also Addendum D. The Impound Policy 
requires officers to exercise their discretion in deciding whether to impound a vehicle in 
favor of preventing needless financial burdens and inconveniences to the owner. See 
Addendum D. The Impound Policy states, "[t]o avoid needless expense and 
inconvenience to the vehicle owner, officers shall use discretion in determining whether 
or not a vehicle should be impounded." (emphasis added). It also allows officers to 
impound a vehicle as a means of enforcing Utah laws or removing a public nuisance. See 
Id. ("Officers of this Department may impound vehicles as a means of enforcing local 
and State laws, removing a public hazard or nuisance, securing evidence, or protecting 
the vehicle and its contents until the owner can take possession of it."). Even when the 
registration of an occupied vehicle is expired, the Impound Policy prohibits impoundment 
unless the registration has been expired for ninety days. And, where registration has been 
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expired for more than ninety days, although officers "may" impound the vehicle, 
impoundment is not mandatory and "[ o ]fficers may exercise discretion on the side of not 
impounding as the facts of the situation dictate." Id. (emphasis added). The Impound 
Policy points out that vehicles will not be impounded simply because they are not 
insured. Id. It also does not allow an officer to impound a vehicle upon arresting or citing 
a driver for a traffic violation. Id. This demonstrates further that the Impound Policy 
requires officers to exercise their discretion by not impounding vehicles except where 
necessary. Thus, reading the Impound Policy in its entirety shows that the policies are 
focused on restricting the situations where an officer should impound a vehicle, thus 
limiting, rather than increasing, an officer's use of discretion. See Addendum D; see also 
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375-376; Hygh, 711 P.2d at 270; Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1243. 
Here, Officer Crowther failed to comply with the Impound Policy. Officer 
Crowther did not seek to "avoid needless expense" to the owner of the vehicle because he 
opted for impounding the vehicle rather than allowing Mr. Olivarez an opportunity to call 
the owner to retrieve his vehicle. See Addendum D; see also R. 147-154. As stated supra, 
there was also no legitimate community care-taking purpose to impound the vehicle as it 
was not causing a "public hazard or nuisance." See Addendum D; see also Sanders, 796 
F.3d at 1243. As also pointed out supra, there was no Utah law or statute which 
mandated the impoundment of the vehicle. See Addendum D; see also Utah Code Ann. 
§41-la-1101(1) (2011). In addition, because the Impound Policy does not require 
impoundment for vehicles that lack insurance or for certain vehicles lacking proper 
registration, it likewise follows that lack of driver's license standing alone does not 
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require impound. 4 This is especially true where the registered owner is available and the 
other requirements for impound are not met. Thus, Officer Crowther decision to impound 
the vehicle directly contravened the impound policies that he was required to follow. 
D. The Impound Search Was Tainted By The Initial Unreasonable And 
Unjustified Stop of Mr. Olivarez 
The vehicle impound in this matter was unjustified because, as argued supra, it 
was the result of an illegal stop of Mr. Olivarez. All evidence that was found in the 
course of the impound search should therefore be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous 
tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Furthermore, the inevitable 
discovery doctrine cannot remove the taint of the illegal stop and impound search of the 
vehicle in this matter as "no inventory of the contents of defendant's vehicle could have 
been conducted but for the unlawful impoundment of the vehicle." See Ibarra, 955 F.2d 
at 1410. See also State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ,I 13, 76 P.3d 1159, 1162 ("The 
exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative (the 
'fruit of unlawful police conduct'), obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional 
4 In Utah, the crime of driving without insurance is a class B misdemeanor pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-302. The Utah Code also makes it a class B or class C 
misdemeanor to drive a vehicle without proper registration under various circumstances. 
See Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1303. And, according to the Utah Code, a person who 
operates a vehicle without a valid driver's license is guilty of either a class B or class C 
misdemeanor, depending on the underlying reasons for why the driving privilege has 
been denied. Utah Code Ann. §53-3-227. Because these crimes are charged similarly and 
have parallel maximum punishments, there would be no need to treat them differently for 
impoundment purposes, and there is nothing in the Impound Policy that suggests 
otherwise. Thus, because it is not proper to impound a vehicle for lack of insurance or 
lack of registration (unless it has been unregistered for more than 90 days), it is also not 
proper to impound a vehicle because the driver lacks a valid driver's license, Officer 
Crowther's reason for the impoundment in this matter. 
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and statutory rights.") (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43, 104 S.Ct. 2501 
(1984)). Thus, the trial court erred in failing to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a 
result of the Fourth Amendment violations in this matter surrounding the stop and 
impound search of the vehicle driven by Mr. Olivarez. Furthermore, as a result of the 
trial court's errors, Mr. Olivarez has been unduly prejudiced because he now has two 
felony convictions as a result of the unconstitutional violations performed by Officer 
Crowther. 
This issue was preserved by defense counsel at a Motion to Suppress Hearing held 
on December 9, 2013. R. 160-163. Counsel argued that the Fourth Amendment required 
Officer Crowther to allow Mr. Olivarez an "opportunity to arrange for [the] disposition of 
[his vehicle]" prior to impounding it because the vehicle "was [in] a safe place, not 
blocking traffic[,] ... and it was clear to the officer that [a] person was available to come 
get the car." R. 162-163. Defense counsel also argued that the vehicle impound violated 
the Impound Policy that the officer was required to follow. R. 162. Nevertheless, if this 
Court finds that this issue was not preserved, this Court may review it for plain error. 
Plain error requires reversal where "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome ... " State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993). 
Under a plain error analysis, an error existed here as Officer Crowther lacked 
justification to impound the vehicle that Mr. Olivarez was driving. See supra. In addition, 
the errors should have been obvious to the district court because established case law 
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discusses the restrictions that arc placed upon officers ,,·hen making impound decisions. 
See Bertine~ 479 U.S. at 375-376: Hygh. 711 P.2d at 270; Sanders. 796 F.3d at 1243. In 
addition, the trial court was provided a copy or the Impound Policy that restricted Officer 
Crowthcr·s impound decisions. See Addendum D. Mr. Olivarez was also prejudiced by 
the errors because he now has felony convictions as a result of the unjustified stop the 
vehicle that he was driving. Because obvious error occurred here and that error 
prejudiced Mr. Olivarez, this court can reverse under the plain error doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, Mr. Romeo Olivarez requests that this Court reverse the 
trial courCs ruling that the stop and impound of Mr. Olivarez's vehicle was legally 
justified in this matter. 
SUBMITTED this /5 JI,. 
i 
dav of December.2015. 
. -Z:::2JJt 
TERESA L. WELCH 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Prosecutor: BECK, STEVEN K 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DELLAPIANA, RALPH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 31, 1984 
Sheriff Office#: 267193 
Audio 
Tape Number: 11 :04 
CHARGES 
MINUTES 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 




April 6, 2015 
l. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/06/2015 Guilty 
2. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/06/2015 Guilty 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed 
five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
RAUL OLIVAREZ 
SENTENCE FINE 
Printed: 04/06/15 11:13:55 
Case No: 131904665 Date: Apr 06, 2015 
Charge# 1 Fine: $500.00 




Total Fine: $500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $254.21 
Total Principal Due: $500.00 
Plus Interest 
Attorney Fees Amount: $300.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 24 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 500.00 which includes the surcharge. Interest may 
increase the final amount due. 
Defendant is to serve 180 days and Is ordered to complete the CATS program. On 
completion of the CATS program defendant is ordered release. 
Defendant is to complete a substance abuse evaluation and any recommended treatment. 
Defendant is to pay $300 recoupment. 
Defendant is to pay $500 fine, which may be offset with the costs of treatment. 
CUSTODY 
The defendant is present in the custody of the Salt Lake County jail. 
Date: 






United States Constitution Amendment IV 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 





United States Constitution Amendment XIV 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereat: are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding 
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such state. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
Vice President. or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
state, ,vho, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of 
the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged 
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States. authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume 
or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States~ or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, 
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
Utah Code §41-6a-804. 
Turning or changing lanes -- Safety -- Signals -- Stopping or sudden decrease in 
speed -- Signal flashing -- Where prohibited. 
41-6a-804. 
(1) 
(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left on a roadway or 
change lanes until: 
(i) the movement can be made with reasonable safety; and 
(ii) an appropriate signal has been given as provided under this section. 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or lcfl or to change lanes shall be given 
continuously for at least the last two seconds preceding the beginning of the 
movement. 
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first 
giving an appropriate signal to the operator of any vehicle immediately to the rear when 
there is opportunity to give a signal. 
(3) 
(a) A stop or turn signal when required shall be given either by the hand and 
arm or by signal lamps. 
(b) If hand and arm signals are used. a person operating a vehicle shall give the 
required hand and arm signals from the left side of the vehicle as follows: 
(c) 
(i) left turn: hand and arm extended horizontally; 
(ii) right turn: hand and arm extended upward; and 
(iii) stop or decrease speed: hand and arm extended downward. 
(i) A person operating a bicycle or device propelled by human power 
may give the required hand and arm signals for a right tum by extending 
the right hand and arm horizontallv to the right. 
.__ ., ..., 
(ii) This Subsection (3 )( c) is an exception to the provision of Subsection 
(3 )(b )(ii). 
(4) A person required to make a signal under this section may not flash a signal: 
(a) on one side only on a disabled vehicle; 
(b) as a courtesy or "do pass" to operators of other vehicles approaching from 
the rear; or 
( c) on one side only of a parked vehicle. 




Utah Code §41-la-1101 (1) (2011) 
Seizure -- Circumstances where permitted -- Impound lot standards. 
41-la-1101(1) 
(l)(a) The division or any peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take 
possession of any vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor: 
(i) that the division or the peace officer has reason to believe has been stolen; 
(ii) on which any identification number has been defaced, altered. or obliterated; 
(iii) that has been abandoned in accordance with Section 4 l-6a-l 408; 
(iv) for which the applicant has written a check for registration or title fees that has 
not been honored by the applicant's bank and that is not paid within 30 days; 
(v) that is placed on the water with improper registration; 
(vi) that is being operated on a highway: 
(A) with registration that has been expired for more than three months; 
(B) having never been properly registered by the current owner; 
(C) with registration that is suspended or revoked; or 
(D) subject to the restriction in Subsection (1 )(b), without owner's or 
operator's security in effect for the vehicle as required under Section 4 l-
l 2a-30 I ; or 
(vii)(A) that the division or the peace officer has reason to believe has been 
involved in an accident described in Section 41-6a-401 ~ 4l-6a-401.3, or 41-6a-
401.5; and 
(B) whose operator did not remain at the scene of the accident until the 
operator fulfilled the requirements described in Section 41-6a-40 I or 4 l-6a-
401. 7. 
(b) The division or any peace officer may not seize and take possession of a vehicle under 
Subsection ( 1 )(a)(vi)(D) if the operator of the vehicle is not carrying evidence of owner's 
or operator's security as defined in Section 4 l - l 2a-303 .2 in the vehicle unless the division 
or peace officer verifies that owner's or operator's security is not in effect for the vehicle 
























District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
BYRON F. BURMESTER, 6844 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (80 I) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STA TE OF UT AH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROMEO LUCERO OLIVAREZ, 
Defendant. 
FINDING OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 131904665 FS 
Hon. Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant's Motion To Supress having been raised in Court in the above entitled matter 
on December 9, 2013. The Court considered memoranda submitted by the Defense and the State 
as well as testimony and evidence adduced at the motion hearing. The Defendant was 
represented by counsel, Ralph Dellapiana, and the State was represented by Deputy District 
Attorney, Byron F. Burmester. The Court now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
1. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Defendant, Romeo Lucero Olivarez was charged with three counts of possession 
of controlled substances, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person and possession of drug paraphernalia arising out of a traffic stop on 
April 30, 2013. 
2. On April 30, 2013 Officer Crowther observed a vehicle coming off the 900 South 
exit onto West Temple turn on its right tum signal but change multiple lanes 
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without pausing 2 seconds for each lane change. When the vehicle turned east 
on 900 South the officer made a traffic stop. 
3. After contactini the Defendant who was the lone occupant of the vehicle, Officer 
Crowther discovered the Defendant's drivers license was denied. Officer 
Crowther further realized that the Defendant was a kno\VIl gang member and 
that he had arrested him recently on unrelated drug charges. 
4. Officer Crowther decided at that point he would impound the vehicle. He 
5. 
6. 
infonned the Defendant and asked the Defendant to get out of the vehicle that 
was registered to someone else. 
Officer Crowther asked the Defendant if he had any weapons or contraband on 
him, to which the Defendant replied that he had brass knuckles. Officer 
Crowther seized the brass knuckles and then arrested the defendant. 
Pursuant to Salt Lake City Police Department policy Officer Crowther began an 
impound inventory of the vehicle. During the inventory officer Crowther found 
methamphetarnine, heroin, and a pipe for ingesting controlled substances. 
7. At some point after the officer had informed the Defendant that he was going to 
impound the vehicle, the Defendant requested that he be pennitted to call the 
owner to retrieve the vehicle. Someone arrived purporting to be the owner after 
the inventory was complete and the vehicle was being hooked up to the tow 
truck. The officer declined to tum the vehicle over and completed the impound 
process. 
8. The defendant filed a motion to suppress. 
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Officer Crowther directly observed a traffic offense and consequently the stop 
was justified at its inception. Further, the officer's questioning of the defendant 
did not exceed the scope of the purpose of the stop. 
Once the vehicle stopped the officer determined that the driver did not have a 
valid license; that he was the only occupant; and that the driver was not the 
owner. Thus the officer's decision to impound the vehicle did not exceed the 
scope of the purpose of the stop. 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the defndant's criminal 
history, gang affiliation, and admission of possessing a dangerous weapon, the 
officer had a reasonable belief in his concern for his safety. 
Officer Crowther conducted the impound pursuant to his department impound 
policy. 
5. Therefore the State has satisfied its burden that the seizure and subsequent 
impound were reasonable and the evidence obtained is the not the fruit of the 
poisonous tree. 
6. Accordingly, the Defendant's motion is denied. 
DA TED this lo th day of ~~r 20J1. 
.---~.--............. 
. . ,• .. 
: . - ., .. 
. . 
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READ AND APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
~/ 








111-400 IMPOUNDS, VEHICLE HOLDS AND 
RELOCATIONS 
Offic~rs of 1h1s Depa:imcnl may impow1d ,·chicles 3S 
u means of enforcing local and S1utc I .. aws, re111ovinu 
a public han1rd or nuiSc1ncc, s..:curing cvid~ncc, or 
protc1.:t1ng the vehicle and its contcnL'; until the owner 
can take possession of i1. To avoid needless expense 
ond inconvenience to 1he \'Chicle owner, nfliccrs shall 
use dlscn:tion in dctcnnining ,,hctht:r or not a vehicle 
should be impounded. 
All impounds will be documcn1cd in !he RMS and on 
a Salt l.okc City Police Dcpartmcnl Impound Reeon. 
·n,e impounding ol1iccr w,11 provide 1hc mw driver 
1he white and pink copies and submit lhc ycllo" copy 
10 Records 
State Impounds will be documented on !he TC· 
5~0/Utah State Tax Commission Vehicle Impound 
Report The unpounding otliccr will pro"1dc 1hc 10w 
dr,\'er !he yellow copy and subnul 1hc \\•h11c and 
goldenrod copies 10 Records, who will forward the 
fonn 10 1he lmpC1und Courdi11a1vr in Auto Thell The 
Impound Coordinator will send 1ho Impound forms 
by mail 10 1hc Motor Vehicle U1v1sion. The pink 
copy has \'Chicle release mfonnalion on the rc,·crsc 
side and will be left with the dri,er. The Di,•is1on of 
~totor Vehicles rnust be nolilicd ,d1!11n ,18 hours of 
impound 
An impound report form will be completed !'or cvtry 
vehicle impounded for any reason 
Si.CPD will provide 1hc ,chicle 0\\11er a Nmice of 
lmpoundmcni and Right 10 Impound I !caring forin 
w11hin 48 hours of a city 1mpoundment This form 
should no1 be used with State 1a, impo,rnds 
The officer w,11 fill m the name of the vehicle owner 
(If d:iwr frorn the information ob1ained by ,alid 
identiiic:mon, 1f av~.11labk The tn\JSt current nddrc~s 
should be obtlincd 
11,c officer w-dl date and s,gn the forrn and deliver 
the original to the vchtclc owner or driver at the time 
oiimpound. Th!.! cop) of the Nmicc of lmpoundmcnt 
and Right to Impound I !caring form should be turned 
into Records who will forward it lo the Impound 
Coordmator lll Aulo Thell The Impound 
Coordina1or v,·ill send notific3tion by certified mail to 
1hc registered owner and lien holder wuhin 5 working 
days of impoundrn.:nt whether or not !he vehicle is 
being held for evidence. 
The initial oi'licer should deliver !he original copy of 
the Notice or lmpou11dmcn1 form to 1he vehicle's 
n:gistcrcd owner or drl\cr Uunng the course of the 
11nes1iYa1ion. If the vehicle's 0\\11er or dnvcr has le l1 
the scc7,e prior lo impound. !he original should be lc!l 
in n visible and safe place tn 1hc vehicle's driver 
companmcnl The ofliccr should write "Unavu1lahlc 
10 Sign" in 1he ''Dehvcr To"' area The copy should 
!hen be forwarded as above. 
The following pcoccdurc will govern the impounding 
uf , chicles for expired registralmn only si1ua1ions 
O\·cupicd \ 'rhiclC's· In case$ where a \'Chicle 
displaying expired rcg1s1ra11011 is accompanied by 1hc 
o,, ntr or a rcsponsihlc party ur if tla: own~r can be 
conlackd, and 1ha1 person \'Critics 1hc rcgis1ra1ion is 
in fact expired. the fol lowing. applies· 
If 1hc exp1ra11on dale is !es, limn 90 days. do nOI 
impound 
If the cxp<ralion dale is 90 days or more aml 
\'cnfication can be obtained us stated above, a 
Stale Impound may be in order. Oificers may 
exercise discretion on the side ofnol impounding 
as the !'nets of the. situation dictate. 
Revoked Rcgislra tiun For various reasons 1he 
Dl\1\1 tln revoke the rcgis1ra1ion of a vehicles. 
\\'hen the regis1m1ion has been revoked, the vehicle 
can be 11npoundcd. holding f'or the vehicle for S1:itc 
Tax 
l 'noccupird \'chides Unoccupied vehicles w,11 nol 
be impounded for expired rcg1s1ra1ion rdying solely 
upon the 1nfonna1ion provided from 1he StalL· 
Computer System. Th" policy does noi preclude 1hc 
cnforcemcn1 of' any City Ordmanccs applicuhle. 
rncl11dmg abandoned vch,clc, or streets for storage. 
1
·:\·o l1Hu ra11l'c" · vchirh:s \\ill 110l be impounded for 
the: rc::1.,on of ··No Insurance·• ·'No Insurance·· can be 
added 10 1hc c110tion as a secondary Ill the primary 
rcasnn for impound 
Parking enforcement pers,mncl nrc authorized lo 
impound ,·duclcs that ~re parked in v1olat1on or Cny 
Ordinances and State Laws Upon rcqut.-st, an officer 
of 1his Department will respor.d and provide 
assistance as needed Appropriale reports and 
documentation will be entered into lhc RMS b) 
Parking Enforcement and mainlained by this 
Department 
If fees arc 10 be wai\ed, the lbllow-np Detective \\ill 
go to the Service Desk, obtain the waiver form and 
Iii! ii oul completely The follow-up de1ec11vc ,, ill 
have the Division/Unit Commander, Ass,,tant 
Division/Unit Commander o: Watch Commander 
approve and initial the form The follow-up detective 
will call the Hearing Ollice at 801-535-6321 and 
nutify them that a fax 1s enroutc. The follow-up 
dctcc1ive will then fax the torm to lhc l·IL·aru:g Offi,:c 
at 801-535-6082 
Tl1e Hearing Olliccr will review the form and will 
either give approval or denial then fox the fom1 hack 
to the Police Department at the number provided by 
the follow-up detective The follow-up dctccti\'e will 
then return the form to the Service Desk The citizen 
will be given a copy to take to the impound lot for 
release of the vehicle. If the rccummendation is to 
denv the foe waiver, the person requesting the waiver 
s:io~ld be referred to the I !caring Officer 
llic officer must determine the appropriate I) pc of 
impound. Cit~ l)r S1ah: and fill out !he appropriate 
11npound form. Only those lowmg companies 
specified by contractual agreement wilh the City w,11 
be used to tow 1rr.pounced wh1clcs 1m non-slate 
1:npounds There 1s onl)- one City Impound lot 
Thcrc arc several .St:1tc-1mpound lots used to store 
impounded vch,dcs The rcponing otliccr musl list 
the Towmg Comp,my, phone number and dcs11nat1011 
in the Vehicle Field on the l:npound Report fmm and 
1s to be included in the Scizcdffowed details page of 
the R\1S 
At the time of impmm<l, the officer must notify 
Dispatch of any holds on the impounded vchicie 
Holds will be documented m the Scizcd.rr('lwed 
details page Pohce personnel will refer tel th,s 
information when a vehicle owner or the O,\ner's 
representative m~uires about release of th~· vehidc 
I !old for Owner. The vehicle may he rdeascd to 
the owner or the O\rner's representative. 
Hold for State Release of the vehicle must be 
obtained through the State Di,.is1on of Motor 
Vehicles. 
I told Reco\'crcd Stoh:n Is cuhcr a hold for 
Dctccti1.cs or hold fo, Owner. 
I !old for Evidence. The ..-chicle can only be 
released up('ln authorization of the mvcstig:iting 
division or the District Annmcy's Office. 
Ir a car 1s impounded as a recovered stoh:n vehicle, 
the car shall~ removed to the City Impound Lot and 
"Hold for Owner" Should 1hc vehicle be improperly 
rel.!istcred, evidence m another case, ownership in 
di;putc, etc., a hl)ld should be placed for the follow-
up squad (Any vch1cl1? which would have been 
released to the owner at the scene can be "I !old for 
Ownd', when impounded When a vehicle is 
impounded with a hold for evidc11cc, the hold will 
expire seven days front the date of impoundmcnt 
The lmpounll Coordinator will send the follow-up 
Det<.'ctivc: an Impound request for approvu! to release. 
If circumstances ret1uirc the hold to he extended past 
the seven-day penod, follow-up mvcstigators musl 
submit the \Hitten request through their 
Division/Unit Commander advising the Impound 
Cciordinawr Clf the extension The lntpClund 
Coc,rdinator will update the computer cnt1y on the 
Seized/Towed details pa~cs indicating the extension 
<lf thc hold. Aficr the extended day has expired, the 
[mpound Coordinal<Jr will send a second request for 
approval to rch:a.,e The follow-up Detcclm: will 
rcmo,,.c the extended hold as soon as poss1hlc 
1\ thliroul!h mv<.·ntorv search will he made of nil 
vehicles being irr.p~u:idcd A tho~ough 111venlory 
scar;:h will include: 
The intl!nor of the vehiclt', including under the 
scats, the glove box. elc. 
Under the hood 
lhc trunk, when p<1ssihlc 
All closed containers, 1 e, sacks, b:igs, boxes, 
etc 
Jhe uflkcr \',ill rernovc all valuables frClm the 
v::h1de and place them in cvidl!ncc: ror safekeeping 
Closed or k1ckcd briefcases. luggage. etc, will bl! 
op.:ncd before being placed in evidence Such items 
will be opened in the presence of u supervisor 1f the 
lm:k~ must be forced or other damage done in order 
J1 
. '• 
to open them. h is recommended the vehicle's o,mcr 
or the driver be present 
All items not considered valuables, such as s;,arc 
tires, old clothing, etc , will be locked in the vehicle's 
trunk, if possible. 
The officer will include the following in the property 
report: 
Valuables placed into evidence 
Valuable ncms left in the ,·chicle because of the 
difficulty of lran,;porting them to evidence (large 
machinery, etc) will be listed in the report's 
details 
If no valuables are found III the whicle, the 
officer will note lhat information in the report's 
narrative 
If a vehick owner requests release of an impounded 
vchiclL· and appears to be intoxicated or othcr,,ise 
incapable of operating the vehicle safely, 
Service/Impound Desk personnel may request that an 
officer be dispalchcd to the desk. The assigned 
officer will evaluate the owm•r's condition und take 
appropriate actior.. 
Ii the owner proves to be intoxicated or unable to 
operate a \'chicle safe!), the vehicle will not be 
rdeased. If the owner is incapacitated, but requests 
that the vehicle be released to another person. and the 
officer is sa1isli1..'d that the other person could legally 
operate the vehicle, the otlieer may authom.e release 
of the vehicle. 
foc;;ess to the C:i1 lm~cu:iCl Lot 
1'io one will he allowed access to the impound lot 
without complying with procedures outlined 111 this 
P"licy. Impound lots under State control arc not 
governed by this poi icy 
Authori1.cd AcrcH 
Access to impounded vehicles stored in the City 
impound lot is limited to 
Salt Lake City police officers, officers of the 
DEA Metro, and oilkers from outside agencies 
including Motor Vehicle Enforcement 
Investigator. 
The vehicle owner or the owner's representative. 
The vchick O\\ncr 1s verified by the State 
Vehicle Registration which has been attached to 
the case by the first individual to run the 
rcgistratmn 
The owner's rcprcscn1at1vc must have a 
notari1.cd h:ttcr from the registered owner 
Venticatiun of release will be by verifying with 
Srnte issued driver's 111:ense, State issued ID or 
passport against the registration o~ notari1.ed 
letter. 
All fees need to be paid pnor 10 releasing any 
vehicle 
Insurance Adjusters: The Insurance Adjuster's 
1dentificlllion mll be ,·erified by State issul.-d 
driver's license, State issued 11) ur passpon 
along wtth a business card from the insurance 
company with their name on the card If the 
Insurance Adjuster is re4ues1ing release of th~ 
vehicle all fees need to be paid 
.Any other person authorized by court order: A 
court order will be verified by State issued 
dmcr's license, State issued ID or passport If 
the coun order states that fees arc to be paid they 
need to he paid prior to releasing If the court 
order 111d1catcs that the individual is not 
responsible for the foes, a \~aiver needs to be 
mitiated by the follow-up Dctecti.,,e 
Leasing Companies· The representative or the 
leasing company must submit n lctler on 
Company letter hcnd verifying that he/she is an 
employee of that leasing company and is 
a:.Jthorizcd to obtnin the release for thot vehicle 
All fees arc required 10 he paid prior to releasing 
lhl: vehidc 
DcJlcrs: The de.ilcr m:.ist show evidence of 
o,mcrsh1p along with proof thut they represent 
that dealership. The dcaler must also presenl the 
dealer plate tu the Impound Yard when 
transporting the vehicle from the Impound lot to 
the dealership unless towed or transported on a 
flatbed. All appropriate fees must be paid pnor 
10 g1vmg a release 
lkg1stered Lien holders or their representatives 
The hen holder must provide a copy of the title 
that shows the lien and proves that 1hc hen 
release: se::tion ha-; not been signed St:lle issued 
driver's license, Seate ID or a passport 1s required 
to verify identification. If a rdcasc is to be given 
to the rcprcscntati vc, they nc..:d to ha vc o letter 
on company lcucrhcud with the mdi.·1dual '!> 
name hstcd 111 the letter authori;,:ing them lo lake 
possession of the vehicle 
Towing Companies If the insurance company 1s 
releasing to a tow company, a copy of the \\Ork 
order with the insurance company's information 
and name of the individual picking up th..: 
vehicle, along with the individual ·s driver's 
license. State ID or passport must he submitted 
at the tune of' rt:4uc:s1. 
If an individual is authorizing a tow company to 
t:1kc possession ofthc1r vchidc, a notarized letter 
stating the tow company's name needs lo he 
submitted al the tim..: of rc4uest lo rcli:'.i~e the 
,chicle, along wnh the tow company's driver's• 
driver's license. State Id. or passport All 
applicable fees need to hi.: paid :11 the time of 
rckasc. 
Company or Trust owned V..:hiclcs The 
ind1v1dual rcqucstmg the rclcosc of the vehicle 
must suhmit a legal d(lCumcnt with th..: comp::my 
name or tnisl name and individual's name on th~ 
document showing that they arc connected to the 
commmv or Trust ond have the right to have the 
vehi~le ~dcascd to them. Driver"s license, State 
lll or passport will also be rl."quin:d for 
iden11tica1ion All fei.:s have t\1 be paid prior IO 
rclcasmg 
Note: lmurance agl!nls may only inspt!ct i·d,ides, 
not remm•e property fro,11 t/1e11t 
An Impound I .ot Inspection and Property R<>lea,;c 
fonn must he presented 10 the 1mr,our~d lot personnel 
IO gain access to a vch1de stored m the lot 
Issuing Impound Lot Inspection 11nd Property 
Release Forms 
A separate lmr-ound Lot lnspec:ion and Pro;,ert; 
Release form must be issued for each vch1ck. 
each time ii 1.'; inspected or searched 
(E.i,.ccption 'lb: Aulu Thell Sergeant may use 
one form to eain nccess to the lot for the purpose 
of verifying- vehicle idcnulication numbers ot~ 
several cars ) 
Vehicles with H,,lds Detectives from this 
Department or DEA Metro, may authon1.c the 
release of itemized property usmg the Impound 
Lot Inspection and 1>ropcrty Release Forms 
Vehicles without Holds SI.CPD Oniccrs, 
officers from outside agencies. ,chicle owners 
and any C>thcr person authorized by this policy 
mav obtain authortlallon forms via the Scr,·1ce 
Dc;k 01 the lmpC1und Coonlinato, 
fkforc issuing a form. any Hold on the vehicle 
must he cleared through the follow-up officer or 
the follow•up officer's supervisor. Officers from 
this Department or DEA Mc1ro should give 
vehick owners, officers. agents or othi.:r 
repres..:n1a11vcs spcc1 lie instruction for cleuring 
llolds. 
Afi..:r hours. emergency property rdcascs may be 
authorized by the on-duty \Vatch Commander 
Property which may be authorized for release 
shall be lirmtcd to the personal property 
contained within the vehicle, but nm attached to 
the vehicle or considered to he pan of the 
vehicle's c41uipment (1c. stereos. whcds. etc) 
lmpoundLMPe~onncl 
Only persons w11h a valid Impound Lot 
lnspcctmn and Property Release form will be 
given access to impounded vehicles. 
• lhc unpound l0t attcmdant should. whenever 
possible, accompany the rcqucs1111g pany during 
inspection of the ,chicle 
Property removed from u vchiclc must be 
verilied against the Impound Lot lnspcclton and 
Properly Release form The vd1iclL· owner or 
representative may only retrieve items itemized 
on the release form unless the release is for 
personal property and the Impound Lot 
personnel will ltst th..: items removed on tlu• 
iorm. The Impound lot person will have the 
person rec..:iving the property vcnfy the accuracy 
of the propeny list. 
Oilin~rs rcmnvmg add1t1011al propeny mu~t 
itemiie the property and its d1spos1tion on the 
form. 
The impound lot nucr.dant will retain the original 
copy of the form and return the yellow copy ID 
the Impound Coord111ator. Th..: Impound 
Coordmntor will attach the yello\\ copy to the 
casl' to be filed for 3 years 
Officers Removmg Prnrerty· Officers removing 
property for evidence must observe accepted search 
and sei,ure practices Any evidence removed mu!>t 














Relocations arc a courtesy to the vehicle ownt!r. 
Illegally parked vehicles should be dealt with 
according to State law or City ordinance and 
Department policy regarding impounds. In some 
circumstances, it may be appropriate for an officer to 
have a legally parked. unattended vehicle relocated to 
another parking place. 
Officers may arrange for the relocation of vehicles at 
the request of other Cily departments. Oflicers will 
explain to those rcprescnta1ivcs from other City 
depanmenLo; that the relocation will be at the expense 
of that department. Vehicles will be relocated to the 
nearest legal parking place as the situation dictates. 
Only those towing companies specified by 
cxmtractual agreement with the City will be used to 
relocate vehicles. 
Officers will notify Dispatch of the description, 
license plate and the location of the relocated vehicle 
and the reason for relocating the vehicle. This 
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RULES OF THE ROAD 
SPEED 
In Utah, there is the "Basic Speed Law" which states 
that you may never drive faster than is reasonably 
safe. However, when there is no sign, and where no 




















20 miles per hour -
1 .When passing a school building or 
grounds during school recess. 
2.While children are going to or leaving 
school during opening or closing hours 
or when flashing lights are operating. 
25 miles per hour - In any business or 
residential area. 
55 miles per hour - On major highways, 
as posted. 
65n5/80 miles per hour - On rural inter 
state highways. Because Nrural" interstate 
is defined by census boundaries, it may 
be confusing to know which areas are 65 
mph, which are 75 mph, and which are 80 
mph. •1 thought this was a 75 mph zone" is 
not a valid response if you are pulled over. 
Remember, only when posted on inter 
state highways is 65, 75, or 80 mph 
allowed. The 6Sn5/80 mph transition 
zones In Utah are indicated with pave-
ment markings and additional signs. 
In addition to the above speed limits, there are times 
when the law requires that you slow down. Some of 
those times include: 
1. When approaching and crossing an intersection or 
railroad crossing. 
2. When approaching and going around a curve. 
3. When approaching the top of a hill. 
4. When traveling upon any narrow or winding road. 
5. When special hazards such as people walking 
beside the road, heavy traffic, or dangerous road 
conditions exist. 
12. 
6. During poor weather conditions. Driving on an icy 
road at 10 miles per hour or driving on an open 
highway on a rainy night at 25 miles per hour may 
be too fast. 
7. Any time when you cannot see clearly. 
8. In any highway work zones where construction, 
maintenance, or utility work is being done. 
9. When approaching any authorized vehicle which is 
flashing red, red and white, or red and blue lights. 
On the other hand, do not drive so slowly that you 
become a source of danger on the road. Traffic offic-
ers are allowed to issue you a citation if you are imped-
ing the normal flow of traffic. 
SIGNALING 
~ignals shall be given by the use of turn signals, stop-
lights, or your hand and arm. Good drivers always sig-
nal their intentions well in advance. Signals are re-
quired: 
1. For two seconds before turning. 
2. For two seconds before beginning any lane 
change. 
3. Any time you pull away from a curb. 
4. When you intend to slow down or stop. Your brake 
lights will accomplish this if they are operating 
properly and can readily be seen. 
5. In addition, most cars have an emergency flasher 
system for use when your car is disabled on the 
highway. Use it. 
Hand Signals for Stops and Turns 
~
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Left Turn Slow or Stop Right Turn 
BACKING 
Be especially careful when backing. Keep your vehicle 
on the right-hand side of the road and do not back un-
nec~ssarily long distances. Make sure the way behind 
you 1s clear before you start backing. Do not interfere 
with other traffic on the highway. Always turn your head 
and look to the rear while backing. Do not back up on a 
freeway or interstate. 
PROPER USE OF LANES 
As our Utah road system becomes more complex, the 
proper use of lanes becomes increasingly important. 
You should be aware of the laws concerning turns, 
lane changes, overtaking, and passing. 
Whenever you are changing lanes or passing, it will be 
necessary for you to completely exit your current lane 
of travel and enter the next lane. 
Turns 
A driver cannot safely operate a vehicle if he/she does 
not know how to make proper turns. In general, a good 
turn involves: 
1. Making up your mind before you get to the turning 
point. 
2. Signaling and safely moving into the proper lane 
well in advance of your turn. If you cannot get into 
the proper lane al least 100 feet before your turn, 
do not turn. 
3. Giving the proper turn signal at least two seconds 
before reaching the point where you plan to turn. 
4. Slowing down to a reasonable turning speed. 
5. Making the turn properly. The following instruc-
tions and illustrations will help you make proper 
turns. 
(Remember, a person may not operate a vehicle 
over, across, or within any part of an island). 
How to Make a Left Turn 
1. Well before reaching the corner, signal your inten-
tion to change lanes, make a head check to the 
left, and move into the left lane. 
2. Start slowing down, and turn on the left turn signal 
at least two seconds before reaching the point 
where you wish to turn. 
3. Look to the right and lo the left before starting to 
make your turn. 
4. Do not start turning until on-coming lanes are 
clear. 
5. Enter the street onto which you are turning just to 
the right of the centerline. 
6. Do not turn from or enter into the right hand lane. 
7. Left turns may be made on a highway across dou-
ble yellow line pavement markings indicating a two 
direction, no-passing zone. 
LEFT lURN 






How to Make a Righi Turn 
1. Well before reaching the corner, signal your inten-
tion to change lanes, make a head check to the 
right, and move into the right lane. 
2. Start slowing down, and turn on the right turn sig-
nal at least two seconds before reaching the cor-
ner. 
3. Look in both directions before you start to make 
your turn. 
4. Keep as close to the right as possible. 
Turn From a Two-way Street onto a One-way Street 
and From a One-way Street onto a Two-way Street 
You may turn left onto a one-way street from a one-
way street on a red light after first coming to a com-
plete stop. 
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Roundabouts 
Roundabouts were created in an effort to reduce the 
number of points where conflict can occur between 
vehicles and other vehicles or pedestrians. A rounda-
bout has 12 potential points of conflict compared to 56 
potential points of conflict at a regular "4-leg· intersec-
tion. A typical roundabout has a mountable curb 
around the outside of the center island to accommo-
date big trucks and semis as necessary. 
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Regular "4-leg" intersection 
With 56 potential points of conflict 
13. 
Roundabout 
With 12 potential points of conflict 
There are four (4) points to remember when using a 
roundabout: 1) always yield to the traffic that is already 
in the roundabout; 2) roundabouts run counter clock-
wise, always enter the roundabout to your right; 3) al-
ways yield to pedestrians; and 4) always signal to the 
right when exiting out of a roundabout. 
The roundabout is a free flowing traffic lane; therefore, 
it is not regulated by traffic lights. It is extremely im-
portant for the driver to be aware of pedestrians that 
might be crossing the traffic lanes of a roundabout. 
Two-Point Turns and Three-Point Turns 
Two-point turns and three-point turns are maneuvers 
that can be used when it is necessary to turn a vehicle 
around on a roadway and there is not enough room 
available to complete a U-Turn. 
The procedure for making a two-point turn is as fol-
lows: 
1. Signal a left turn 
2. Complete a head check for traffic and pedestrians 
3. Pull to the left into the driveway 
4. Stop and shift into reverse 
5. Complete a head check for traffic and pedestrians 
6. Turn the steering wheel to the right 
7. Back out of the driveway and into the proper lane 
8. Stop, shift into gear, and move forward 
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14. 2 POINT TURN 
The procedure for making a three-point turn is as fol-
lows: 
1. Signal right 
2. Complete a head check for traffic and pedestrians 
3. Pull over to the right side of the roadway 
4. Signal left 
5. Complete a head check for traffic and pedestrians 
6. Pull to the left over the oncoming travel lane 
7. Stop and shift into reverse 
8. Complete a head check for traffic and pedestrians 
9. Turn the wheels to the right and back slowly 
across the roadway 
10. Stop and shift into forward gear 
11. Complete a head check for traffic and pedestrians 
12. Pull forward into the travel lane 
3 POINT TURN 
U-Turns 
You must never make a U-turn: 
D On any curve. 
D Near the top of a hill where you cannot see or be 
seen from both directions for 500 feet. 
D Where prohibited by an official traffic control de-
vice. 
D On a railroad track or railroad grade crossing. 
0 On a freeway 
Each city has its own law concerning U-turns. Be sure 
you know the specific law of the city in which you are 
driving. A U-turn should only be made on a street or 
highway which is sufficiently wide enough to allow a 
tum to be made from the left hand lane or just right of 
the center line or center of the street. 
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Many drivers feel that using only their mirrors to check 
for other traffic is adequate for changing lanes. The 
illustration below shows some "blind spots" which can-
not be seen when using your mirrors. Drivers who fail 
to check these areas by looking over their shoul-
ders cause many crashes. 
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To help avoid crashes caused by dangerous lane 
changes, we suggest that you practice the following 
simple rules: 
1. Glance in your rearview mirrors. Be certain that no 
one is preparing to pass you. 
2. Look over your shoulder in the direction you want 
to move. Be sure no one is near the left or right 
rear corners of your vehicle. These areas are 
"blind spots." To see the "blind spots," you have to 
turn your head and look. 
3. Check quickly. Do not take your eyes off of the 
road ahead of you for more than an instant. The 
vehicle ahead of you could stop suddenly while 
you are checking over your shoulder. 
4. Drive defensively by making sure your lane 
change can be completed safely. Be aware of the 
movements of all vehicles around you. 
5. Whenever possible, maintain your speed when 
changing lanes. A driver who frequently speeds up 
or slows down creates a dangerous situation for all 
drivers on the road. 
6. Try to help those drivers who check only their mir-
rors when they change lanes. One way to do that 
is to avoid driving in their "blind spots." 
OVERTAKING AND PASSING 
If you desire to pass another vehicle, do it safely and 
follow these suggestions: 
1. Maintain a proper following distance as you ap-
proach the vehicle you intend to pass. A way to 
determine the proper following distance is to use 
the "two second rule" which means it should take 
your car at least two seconds to reach the spot 
that the car ahead of you just passed. You may 
need to give yourself a "four second or more" 
cushion if you are driving on slippery roads, follow-
ing a motorcycle, pulling a trailer, or following large 
vehicles. 
2. Give proper signals. 
3. Change lanes carefully. Do not forget to check 
your blind spots. If you are driving on a two-lane 
highway, do not start to pass if you cannot return 
to your side of the road safely. 
NOTE: When passing, move completely into the 
left lane. 
4. After passing and before returning to the proper 
lane, check your blind spot again. Make sure there 
is plenty of room between you and the car you 
have just passed. Avoid cutting in too quickly. A 
good rule is to wait until the vehicle you have just 
passed can be seen in your inside rearview mirror. 
5. On a highway with two-way traffic, get back to the 
right-hand side of the road before coming within 
200 feet of any vehicle approaching from the op-
posite direction . 
6. You must yield the left lane on a multiple lane 
highway to vehicles approaching you from the 
rear. 
A new Utah law allows you to pass a bicycle or moped 
proceeding in the same direction left of the center lane 
if the bicycle or moped is travelling at a speed less 
than the reasonable speed. Including, passing in a no 
passing zone, if it is safe to do so. 
There are only two times when you may pass to the 
right of another vehicle. They are shown in the illustra-
tions below. 
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Remember, il is illegal to leave the roadway when 
passing on the right. 
At all other times you must pass to the left. The follow-
ing illustrations show situations when you may not 
pass. 
DO NOT PASS OR CHANGE LANES 
I I 






When approaching or while 
crossing a railroad crossing 
When approaching within 
100 feel of crossing an 
intersection 
DO NOT PASS 
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Over double yellow lines 
DO NOT PASS 
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When solid yellow 
line is in your lane 
In the lwo-way left turn lane (shared turn lane) 
Passing in a no passing zone is legal if you are pass-
ing a bicycle or moped traveling in the same direction 
as you are al a speed that is slower than the reasona-
ble speed of traffic if the pass can be made safely. 
MERGING AND GORE AREA 
If you are merging into a lane of traffic, you must yield 
the right-of-way lo all vehicles traveling the continuing 
lane of traffic and which are close enough to be an 
immediate threat. It is against the law to cross over or 
to drive in the "gore area." The gore area is between 
the white solid lines of a lane of traffic and a lane used 
lo either enter or exit from that traffic lane. The gore 
area can also appear when two highways merge or 
split. Do not cross over the solid white lines. 
RIGHT-OF-WAY 
The other driver may be required to yield the right-of-
way to you, but do not let your life depend on it. It is 
more important to avoid crashes than to insist on your 
right-of-way. The following are some rules to follow 
which will help you avoid a crash and could possibly 
save your life or the lives of others. 
Intersections (4-way stops) 
If you arrive at an intersection at approximately the 
same time as vehicles from different directions, the 
driver on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehi-
cle on the right. For example, the intersection in the 
illustration below is controlled by four stop signs. Car A 
yields to car B because car B is on the right. 
' A 
If you are in an intersection and want to turn left, you 
must yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching 
from the opposite direction. After yielding, you may turn 
left if it is safe to do so. In the situation shown below, 




COURTESY IS THE KEY TO SAFETY 
You must yield to vehicles from a different roadway if 
your corner is controlled by stop signs, yield signs. or 
red lights. In the illustration below. car A must yield to 
car B since the corner for car A is controlled by a stop 
sign. 
Emergency Vehicles 
When police cars, fire engines, ambulances, or other 
emergency vehicles approach using sirens, emergen-
cy lights, or other warning devices, you MUST YIELD 
the right-of-way. DRIVE AT ONCE TO THE RIGHT 
SIDE OF THE ROAD AND STOP until the emergency 
vehicle has passed. 
Unless you are on official business, do not follow with-
in 500 feet of any fire vehicle responding to an alarm. 
You may not drive or park on the same block where 
the fire vehicle has stopped to answer an alarm. 
NOTE: When approaching a stationary emergency 
vehicle with fl ash ing lights, you must reduce your 
speed , provide as much space as practical to the 
emergency vehicle, and if practical and it is safe to 
do so, make a lane change into a lane away from 
the emergency vehicle. 
If you are convicted for NOT making a lane change 
or slowing down when approaching a stopped 
emergency vehicle, you must attend a four (4) hour 
live classroom defensive driving course within 90 
days of conviction. If you fail to attend the defen-
sive driving class, your license wil l be suspended 
for 90 days . 
Pedestrians 
If a pedestrian is crossing the street in a "marked" or 
"unmarked" crosswalk, you must yield the right-of-way 
to the pedestrian when the pedestrian is upon the half 
of the roadway upon which your vehicle is traveling. 
Drivers must also yield when a pedestrian approach-
ing from the opposite side of the roadway is close to 
the center of the roadway. In addition, any vehicle 
crossing a sidewalk must yield to all traffic on the side-
walk. In the illustration below, the area from where 
sidewalk "A" ends and sidewalk "B" begins is a legal 
crosswalk, even though there are no painted lines. For 







Many people seem to feel that a "rolling stop" is ade-
quate when they are required to stop. The following 
situations are times when you must make a complete 
stop: 
1. At a steady (non-nashing) red light or at a flashing 
red light. 
2. At all stop signs . 
3. At railroad crossings controlled by nashing sig-
nals, gates, a watchman, or stop signs. Stop more 
than 15 feel (but not more than 50 feet) away 
from the nearest rail until it is safe to continue. If 
there is a gale, wait for it to be raised. 
4. If a school bus is displaying alternating nashing 
red light signals visible from the front or rear. Stop 
immediately before reaching the bus. Do not pro-
ceed until the flashing red light signal ceases 
to stop. IF YOU ARE: 
18 . 
a. Traveling on a divided highway having four or 
more lanes with a median separating the 
traffic, it is only necessary for the vehicles 
traveling in both lanes behind the school bus 
to stop, and not the traffic traveling in the 
opposite direction. 
b. Traveling on a two-lane roadway, traffic in 
both directions is required to stop. 
c. Traveling on a four-lane roadway without a 
median, traffic in both directions is required to 
slop. 
d. Traveling on a highway having five or more 
lanes and having a shared center turn lane, it 
is only required for the vehicle in both lanes 
behind the school bus to come to a complete 
stop. Vehicles traveling in the opposite direc-
tion are not legally required to stop. 
Two Lanes 
m® = ® 
Three or more Lanes, no spear.it ion 
It is important to note that although you may not be 
required by law to stop when you see a stopped school 
bus, you should be aware that students will be getting 
on and off the bus. Children are unpredictable and 
could run into the road at any lime. Use caution as you 
are driving near school buses and adjust your speed 
accordingly. 
NOTE: School bus drivers may report vehicles that 
improperly pass school buses . The report may be 
forwarded to the local law enforcement agency for 
investigation. Fines range from $100 to S500; and 
remember, a conviction for passing a school bus 
illegally usually means an increase in insurance 
rates. 
5. At the scene of any crash in which you may be 
involved as a driver. You must meet all legal re-
quirements before you may leave the crash scene. 
6. When a police or other peace officer requests you 
to stop. 
7. Prior to a sidewalk area, or street, when coming 
onto a street or highway from an alley, private 
driveway, private road, or from a building. 
PARKING 
In the interest of public safety, there are several places 
where you are not allowed lo park. These places in-
clude: 
1. On a sidewalk. 
2. In front of a public or private driveway. 
3. In an intersection. 
4. Within 15 feet of a fire hydrant. 
5. On a crosswalk. 
6. Within 20 feet of a crosswalk. 
7. Within 30 feet of any flashing beacon, stop sign, 
yield sign, or traffic control signal. 
8. In an area which is posted for pedestrian use or 
within 30 feet of the edges of that area. 
9. On any railroad track or within 50 feet of the near-
est rail of a railroad crossing. 
10. Within 20 feel of the driveway entrance to any fire 
station. Also, if signs are posted, you may not park 
on the opposite side of the road if you are within 
75 feet of the fire station entrance. 
11 . Alongside or opposite any street excavation or 
obstruction when stopping or parking would block 
traffic. 
12. On the roadway side of any vehicle stopped or 
parked at the edge or curb of a street (this means 
that you cannot double park). 
13. On any bridge or other elevated highway structure 
or in a highway tunnel. 
14. At any place where official signs prohibit stopping. 
15. On the shoulder of any interstate highway. These 
areas may be used only if your vehicle breaks 
down or you are in physical distress. 
16. Red painted curbs or red zones. 
Many drivers avoid parallel parking or parking on a hill. 
You can increase your driving abilities and conven-
ience by learning those skills. 
PARKING ON A HILL 
1. If you are parking uphill beside a curb, turn your 
front wheels away from the curb and let your car 
roll back so that the front tire touches the curb. 
2.. Never leave your vehicle until you have set the 
emergency brake, stopped the motor, removed 
the ignition key, and locked the doors. 
3. Pull as far off the road as reasonable to park. If 
parking next to a curb, the back wheel of your car 
must be no further than 12 inches away from the 
curb. 
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4. If your parking would block the flow of traffic, find 
another place to park. 
5. If you are parked outside a business or residential 
area, your vehicle must be clearly seen from 200 
feet in each direction. 
6. A courteous driver never parks too close to anoth-
er car. Parking too close to another car could re-
sult in damage to your car. 
PARALLEL PARKING 
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HIGHWAY WORK ZONES 
Highway work zones are those portions of a street or 
highway where construction, maintenance or utility 
work is being done to the road, its shoulders, or any 
other items related to the roadway. This includes work 
such as underground and overhead utility work, tree 
trimming, and surveying activities. Highway work 
zones are easily recognized by the presence of orange 
signing and other orange traffic control devices, flash-
ing lights on equipment, and workers dressed in highly 
visible clothing. 
Each year nearly a thousand people are killed and 
thousands are injured as a result of crashes in high-
way work zones. Some of these are highway workers, 
naggers, or law enforcement officials. However, over 
80% of the fatalities and injuries are suffered by driv-
ers, passengers, and pedestrians. Many of these work 
zone crashes are preventable. 
Highway workers are trained on how to set up safe 
work zones with directional traffic signs and devices. 
Motorists and pedestrians are responsible for knowing 
how to read and react to these directions. Paying at-
tention and driving cautiously and courteously are the 
most important steps in preventing crashes while driv-
ing through highway work zones. 
NOTE: Double Fines: The courts are required to 
fine a driver who speeds in a highway construction 
zone at least twice the amount of the regular fine 
for speeding. 
Driving Tips 
Signing, traffic control devices, roadway markings, 
naggers, and law enforcement officers are used to 
protect highway workers and direct drivers safely 
through work zones or along carefully marked detours. 
In many work zone situations, normal speed limits may 
be reduced for safety reasons. These reduced speed 
limits are clearly posted within the work zone. If there 
are no reduced speed limit postings, drivers should 
obey the normal posted speed limit, but continue to be 







When you travel through a work zone, remember 
these three tips: 
• Adjust your speed to conditions. 
• Adjust your lane position away from workers 
and equipment. 
O Prepare for the unexpected. 
Because of their traveling speed and size, construction 
and repair equipment can 'present an unusual condi-
tion to motorists and pedestrians. It is important to 
note that equipment operators do not have the 
same ability to see around their vehicles as most 
drivers do. This makes it important for drivers and 
pedestrians to give them extra room and be prepared 
for the unexpected. 
Night Work Zones 
More and more roadway work is being completed after 
dark. In many situations, night work is the better alter-
native to restricting daytime use of the roadway, pri-
marily to relieve traffic congestion for motorists. 
The hazards of driving through highway work zones 
are increased at night. Use extreme caution when driv-
ing through night work zones. 
Flaggers Instructions 
Flaggers and law enforcement officers are often ~sed 
to give specific directions in work zones. Drivers 
should slow down and use extreme caution when ap-
proaching a flagger or officer. Follow all directions_ giv-
en by the nagger or officer. Failure to observe direc-
tions given by a nagger or officer may result in a cita-
tion. 
Work Zone Traffic Control Devices 
Highway work zones are set up according to the type 
of road and the work to be done on the road. Various 
traffic control devices are used in construction, mainte-
nance and work areas to direct drivers and pedestri-
ans safely through or around the work zone and pro-
vide for the safety of the highway workers. The most 
commonly used traffic control devices are signs, barri-
cades, drums, cones, tubes, and flashing arrow pan-
els. The basic color used for most of these devices is 
orange. 
20. 
Road Work Signs 
Construction signs are used to notify drivers of unusual 
or potentially dangerous conditions on or near the trav-
eled way. All temporary signs in work zones have an 
orange background and black letters or symbols. Most 
of these signs are diamond shaped, although some are 
rectangular. 
Chapter 3 Sample Test Questions 
1. True or False 
You may not park with-in 25 feet of a crosswalk. 
2. True or False 
If you are convicted for NOT making a lane change or 
slowing down when approaching a stopped emergency 
vehicle, you must attend a four (4) hour live classroom 
defensive driving course within 90 days of conviction. 
3. It is permissible to drive on the left half of the road-
way: 
A. To reach a parking space on the other side of the 
road. 
B. When crossing a railroad track. 
C. When passing a vehicle going the same direction 
on a two-lane road with sufficient clearance. 
4. True or False 
There may be times when driving 10 miles per hour is 
too fast for existing conditions. 
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